Abstract. Defence strategies of established, familiar rock pipit neighbours were studied in a population breeding at high density. Theoretical arguments suggest that an armistice and some form of cooperative defence should occur between familiar, territorial neighbours when an intruder tries to settle in an occupied area and owners risk losing part of their territories and renegotiating boundaries. Boundary displays were at a low and steady level after neighbours had been claiming their territories for 4 days and owners were then considered familiar and established. Familiar neighbours entered into an armistice when confronted with an intruder in border zones and also in the adjacent area, that is, inside the familiar neighbour's territory boundary. Neighbours were also involved in coordinated evictions of intruders in half of the encounters between two neighbours and an intruder within established territories. Hence, observational data on fighting behaviour of rock pipit neighbours show the existence of armistice and support the hypothesis of cooperative defence among established, territorial neighbours.
There are several reasons why territory owners are hard to evict: for example, they know the terrain (i.e. location of resources, refugia, etc.), they have more to fight for (i.e. boundary, mate, nest, young, etc.) and they are often experienced males/ fighters. Several hypotheses have been put forward to explain territorial fighting strategies (Maynard Smith 1974; Parker 1974; Maynard Smith & Parker 1976; Parker & Rubenstein 1981) . Two hypotheses are applicable to many territorial systems, the value asymmetry hypothesis and resource-holding potential hypothesis (see e.g. Beletsky & Orians 1989 for details). However, there might be another explanation as well. Even if neighbours are involved in competition among themselves, they should have mutual interests that might add a cooperative dimension to an otherwise hostile situation (Getty 1987) . Hence, established neighbours should enter an armistice (i.e. a temporary suspension of hostilities) and possibly also cooperate during intrusions. The latter implies, according to Getty (1987) , that a territory defender would pay additional immediate costs beyond those absolutely necessary to defend its own territory, that is, he should harass an intruder on both sides of the territory boundary when he himself is not harassed in these contexts. Getty (1987) used game theoretical arguments to derive two new hypotheses to explain why owners defeat unfamiliar intruders. The most plausible and simple hypothesis is that it may benefit an owner to help its established neighbour to defend, so it can avoid having to renegotiate the boundaries with a new and potentially stronger male which implies a new cost (Krebs 1982) . This hypothesis is plausible because it assumes net positive benefits to helping (i.e. immediate rewards) without requiring, like Getty's other hypothesis, repetition and undiscounted future rewards (cf. Prisoner's Dilemma, Axelrod 1984). Furthermore, 'there is no empirical evidence of non-kin cooperation in a situation, natural or contrived, where the payoffs are known to conform to a Prisoner's Dilemma' (Clements & Stephens 1995) , although some authors have claimed to have identified such situations (e.g. Wilkinson 1984; Milinski 1987) .
I predict that a high-density breeding area with many floaters should impose severe strain on defenders because there will be many intrusions. Thus, familiar, territorial neighbours should benefit from particular defence patterns such as
